Georgia Law Review
Volume 53

Number 3

Article 5

2019

The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize ThirdParty Data After Carpenter
Michael Gentithes
Visiting Assistant Professor Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Privacy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gentithes, Michael (2019) "The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize Third-Party Data
After Carpenter," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 53: No. 3, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Gentithes: The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize Third-Pa

THE END OF MILLER’S TIME: HOW
SENSITIVITY CAN CATEGORIZE THIRDPARTY DATA AFTER CARPENTER
Michael Gentithes*
For over 40 years, the Supreme Court has permitted
government investigators to warrantlessly collect
information that citizens disclose to third-party service
providers. That third-party doctrine is under significant
strain in the modern, networked world. Yet scholarly
responses typically fall into unhelpfully extreme camps,
either championing an absolute version of the doctrine
or calling for its abolition. In Carpenter v. United
States, the Court suggested a middle road, holding that
some categories of data—such as digital location
information collected from cell phones—do not neatly
fall into the third-party doctrine’s dichotomy between
unprotected, disclosed information and protected,
undisclosed information. But the majority elucidated
little rationale upon which to draw such nuanced
distinctions.
This Article provides the missing rationale for such
categorization: informational sensitivity. Disclosure to a
third party matters but is not a trump card. Sensitivity
matters too. I thus propose a two-step test to determine if
the government must obtain a warrant before collecting
information from a third party. First, the Court should
analyze the information’s sensitivity, placing it on a
sensitivity continuum rather than a disclosure
dichotomy. The Court can look to related jurisprudence,
and the inherent meaning such information conveys, to
determine placement on that continuum. Second, if the
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information is sensitive, the Court should decide
whether the government has collected enough of it to
create an informational mosaic of the citizen. If so, that
collection is a search.
The Court has long held that some data, like medical
records or phone conversations, are too sensitive to be
warrantlessly
collected
from
third
parties.
Intermediately sensitive data, like the financial
information in United States v. Miller and the cell site
location information in Carpenter, might be
warrantlessly collected in small amounts, but is too
sensitive for warrantless collection in bulk. The Court
should adjust the third-party doctrine to account for
such sensitive information and craft provisional rules to
protect it. Doing so will enhance both the public’s
security and its regard for the Court.
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INTRODUCTION
For over four decades, Supreme Court precedent has suggested
that when citizens disclose information to any non-governmental
third party, they relinquish their expectation that the information
is private—and hence relinquish any Fourth Amendment rights—
no matter how sensitive that information may be.1 The most
influential case creating that third-party doctrine, United States v.
Miller,
established
that
government
investigators
can
warrantlessly gather unlimited financial data from bankers to
whom citizens have disclosed it.2 The doctrine has come under
significant strain in today’s networked world, as the recent
Carpenter v. United States litigation has shown.3 Yet scholarly
views on the third-party doctrine have not adequately responded,
mostly falling into unhelpfully extreme camps. The doctrine’s
champions claim that it should mean just what it says: citizens
relinquish any expectation of privacy, and hence any Fourth
Amendment protection, in information they willingly disclose to
third parties.4 Abolitionists respond that the third-party doctrine is
1

The Justices have held that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
2 Id. at 446. Three years later, the Court expanded the doctrine to include far less
sensitive information—the phone numbers citizens dial from their home telephone. See Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
3 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“This sort of digital data—personal location information
maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents.”).
4 Orin Kerr describes this as the “eyewitness rule”—the idea that there is no Fourth
Amendment right preventing others from telling the government what they have seen or
heard about you. See Orin Kerr, Symposium: Carpenter and the Eyewitness Rule,
SCOTUSBLOG, (Aug. 4, 2017, 1:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposiumcarpenter-eyewitness-rule/ (“One of the most basic ideas in Fourth Amendment law is what
you might call the eyewitness rule: The government can always talk to eyewitnesses. If the
police find out a bank was robbed, they can go to the bank and interview those who saw the
crime occur. They can talk to the bank clerk about what he observed. They can talk to the
security guard about what she experienced. They can talk to bank customers about what
happened. These interviews, whether voluntary or compelled, don’t trigger the Fourth
Amendment. There’s just no Fourth Amendment right to prevent people from talking about
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an aberration that should be overruled in its entirety.5 According to
abolitionists, citizens do not voluntarily convey data to third parties
nor do they assume the risk that a third party will disclose it to
inquiring investigators, because citizens must use many third-party
services—like banking and telecommunications—just to survive in
the modern world.6
In the Court’s most recent term, a majority of the Justices
favored a categorical approach to data disclosed to third parties.7
The Carpenter majority suggested that some categories of data—
such as digital location information collected from cell phones—do
not neatly fall into the third-party doctrine’s dichotomy between
unprotected, disclosed information and protected, undisclosed
information.8 But the majority elucidated little rationale, beyond
what they saw you do.”). The ABA’s proposed standards on law enforcement access to third
party records also highlight the resonance of the third-party rationale: “Privacy is a divisible
commodity, meaning information often retains some degree of privacy despite being shared.
Nonetheless, disclosures can affect privacy. . . . [W]hat is given to even one person or entity
is more likely to be further disseminated than before.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT: ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS § 25-4.1(a) cmt. (3d ed. 2013)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (citations omitted).
5 See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
13 (2012) (“[T]he most egregious aspect of the third-party doctrine [is] its immunization of
governmental acquisition of personal information held by third parties.” (citations omitted)).
6 As I argue in Part II.A below, this critique of the assumption of the risk rationale has a
long lineage extending from the dissents in the original third-party-doctrine cases to modern
Fourth Amendment scholarship. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 448–51 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Smith, 442 U.S. at 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 25-4.1(a); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth
Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 267 (2016)
(“It is . . . impossible to fully participate in modern economic life without involving a bank to
execute transactions. Because this third-party interaction is unavoidable, it undermines the
assumption of risk rationale.”); Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the
Third-Party
Records
Doctrine
Be
Revisited?,
A.B.A.
J.,
Aug.
2012,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_data_question_should_the_thirdparty_records_doctrine_be_revisited/. (“The reality is quite different, though, almost akin to
compelled consent, which is not consent at all. If you want to communicate efficiently today,
your communications likely will go through your ISP’s servers. The alternative means of
communication either involve conveying information to other third parties, or traveling to the
other communicant so you can have a personal chat. Consent in this context has little
meaning.”).
7 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (“[W]hile the third-party doctrine applies to telephone
numbers and bank records, it is not clear whether its logic extends to the qualitatively
different category of cell-site records.”).
8 See id. at 2220 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact
that the Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome
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the Justices’ intuitions, upon which to draw such nuanced
categorical distinctions.9
This Article provides that missing rationale. I chart a middle
course between the champions and the abolitionists of the thirdparty doctrine, one that helpfully supplements the Court’s
categorical approach.10 While disclosed information receives less
Fourth Amendment protection, disclosure is not a trump card.11 My

Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”). The varied dissents in Carpenter, on
the other hand, alternately decried and celebrated that doctrine’s death. See id. at 2230
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority “misreads this Court’s precedents, old
and recent, and transforms Miller and Smith into an unprincipled and unworkable doctrine,”
creating a “newly conceived constitutional standard [that] will cause confusion; will
undermine traditional and important law enforcement practices; and will allow the cell phone
to become a protected medium that dangerous persons will use to commit serious crimes”);
id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that citizens “often do reasonably expect that
information they entrust to third parties . . . will be kept private,” and that the Court “has
never offered a persuasive justification” for the third-party doctrine’s contrary holding).
9 As Justice Kennedy’s dissent highlighted, the majority offered only a “multifactor
analysis . . . considering intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, and
voluntariness,” which he labeled an “unstable foundation” for a categorical approach to the
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to information disclosed to third parties. Id. at 2234
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10 See id. at 2219 (“There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronical of location
information casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking
for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant
extension of it to a distinct category of information.”).
11 The champions’ view focuses too narrowly upon the guilty criminals that are the subject
of most Fourth Amendment litigation and the police officers who pursue them. Unlike many
of the Constitution’s criminal protections, which are expressly provided to individual
defendants, the Fourth Amendment focuses on “the people,” who are guaranteed “the right .
. . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. CONST. amend IV. See
also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 142–43 (2012) (“The aim of the Fourth Amendment is. . . the
preservation of a vibrant society that respects the freedom and autonomy of each
individual.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 120 (2008) (“But in
the Fourth Amendment, the rightholders are the people. . .” (emphasis in original)). As I
discuss more below in Part IV, some current Fourth Amendment scholarship misleadingly
suggests that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a series of adjustments to ensure a
consistent degree of difficulty for cops uncovering crime. See Orin S. Kerr, An EquilibriumAdjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 486 (2011) (arguing
that new technologies “threaten the privacy/security balance because they enable both cops
and robbers to accomplish tasks they couldn’t before, or else to do old tasks more easily or
cheaply than before”); see also Michael Gentithes, Tranquility & Mosaics in the Fourth
Amendment: How Our Collective Interest in Constitutional Tranquility Renders Data
Dragnets Like the NSA’s Telephony Metadata Program a Search, 82 TENN. L. REV. 937, 948
(2015). But as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, Fourth Amendment doctrine protects
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proposal builds upon earlier efforts to establish a sliding scale of
Fourth Amendment protection, but deemphasizes empiricallymeasured views of privacy or legislative responses to government
investigatory techniques.12 Instead, I employ the concept of
informational sensitivity to suggest that the third-party doctrine
should allow for moderate protection for much of the information we
commonly disclose to third parties. Using that approach, the Court
should end Miller’s time as an absolutist precedent granting
warrantless access to sensitive information like our financial
records in any form or quantity.13
I propose a two-step test to determine whether the government
must obtain a warrant to collect particular categories of information
from a third party. In the first step, the Court should analyze that
information’s sensitivity, placing it on a sensitivity continuum
rather than a dichotomy between disclosed and undisclosed data.
The Court can look to related jurisprudence, and the inherent
meaning such information conveys, to determine placement on the
sensitivity continuum. For instance, Miller’s financial information
and Carpenter’s cell site location information (CSLI) should be
intermediate points on that continuum because (1) the Court has
discussed how sensitive those categories of information are in
related cases and (2) that information conveys significant
substantive meaning on its face.14 While disclosed metadata is not
“the innocent and guilty alike.” Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Gentithes, supra.
12 See infra Part II.B (discussing the ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4). For additional sliding
scale approaches to the Fourth Amendment, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart”
Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 621–22 (2017); Price, supra note 6, at 268–69.
13 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 121 (“‘Modernization’ cannot be a one-way street
where the government benefits from new technologies while citizens are left with no
protective buffers other than those that sufficed in 1791—the roofs, walls, and sealed
envelopes that afforded complete privacy in the eighteenth century.”).
14 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (emphasizing the intimate window that CSLI provides
into a customer’s life and insisting that its “unique nature” requires categorization outside of
the third-party doctrine’s strict dichotomy). These statements hint at the importance of the
inherent meaning that information facially conveys when categorizing that information for
third-party doctrine purposes. Additionally, at the time Carpenter was decided, the Court’s
prior jurisprudence strongly suggested that long-term location information might be
particularly sensitive. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (“Data on a cell phone can also reveal
where a person has been. Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart
phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
around town but also within a particular building.”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations
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sensitive and may be subject to warrantless collection in bulk,
disclosed information with an inherent magnitude of sensitivity
merits further scrutiny.15
In the second step, the Court should decide whether the
government has collected enough sensitive information to create an
informational mosaic of the citizen, thereby conducting a search.16
A citizen has a small but cognizable expectation of privacy17 in each
such sensitive datum that a third party collects. Although
government collection of one or even several of those data points
may not raise constitutional concerns, if the government collects
enough of them, the data points create such a detailed picture of the
citizen’s life that the government has conducted a search for which
it must usually obtain a warrant.18

of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). As I discuss in more detail in Part IV
below, these nuggets of related jurisprudence suggest the sensitivity of location information.
See Parts II.C & II.D for a more detailed explanation of how the Court should determine
sensitivity and additional examples.
15 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ( “GPS monitoring generates
a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about [his or her] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”); see also
SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 129 (“[R]outing information in our email is the functional
equivalent of the telephone numbers that current Fourth Amendment law does not protect.
But the content of our email is the functional equivalent of the content of a phone
conversation. On any sensible approach to communications privacy, email content and
telephone content should have identical protection.” (emphasis in original)). But see Orin S.
Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1005, 1020–21 (2010) (arguing that email addressing information does not convey content
and is therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment.). As I discuss in Part II. B below,
this open acknowledgement that unlimited collection of some categories of non-sensitive data
does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment also distinguishes my approach from other
efforts to measure the “privacy” of information on a sliding scale, such as the ABA’s proposed
standards on law enforcement access to third party records. See generally ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 4.
16 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (establishing the modern test
for what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
17 See id. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that proving a governmental
intrusion into one’s reasonable expectation of privacy is “a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
18 For more general background on the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment, see David
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 68–69 (2013);
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012).
My position here is also consistent with my earlier work on the mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment and constitutional tranquility, as I discuss in Part II.B below. See Gentithes,
supra note 11, at 960–65.
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My proposal accommodates the doctrine’s limits that the Court
has long tacitly accepted and recently aimed to formalize.19 While
telephone numbers delivered to a third-party telephone company
are wholly unprotected under the Fourth Amendment, other
information revealed to third parties, like medical information,20
the content of a conversation,21 or CSLI,22 are protected. Some types
of data are inherently sensitive, such as internet search histories,
collections of photographs, and—despite the holding in Miller—
financial information.23 Following its instincts in these cases, the
Court should adjust the third-party doctrine, dissolve the false
dichotomy between disclosed and undisclosed data, and offer limited
protection to categories of sensitive information even if they are
given to third parties.
Stare decisis does not require the Court to blindly uphold Miller.
Third-party-doctrine cases examine the constitutionality of new law
enforcement efforts to gather information about suspects over an
extended timeline. Such cases consider technological advances that
were unimaginable just years earlier.24 Because of those challenges,
third-party cases should be viewed as a series of provisional
prescriptions to which stare decisis does not fully apply. Citizens
deserve, and the Court should not hesitate to craft, a reimagined
Fourth Amendment that provides some protection to the sizeable
caches of sensitive information that citizens regularly convey to
third-party service providers while performing mundane tasks.25
In Part I below, I explain how the Court created the current
third-party doctrine, with emphasis on how it later tacitly
See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text..
21 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
23 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90, 2493 (2014). As I discuss in more detail
in Part II.D.1 below, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence also suggests that financial
information is particularly sensitive as a form of constitutionally-protected free speech. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16–20 (1976).
24 For a discussion of some of those emerging technologies, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 192–
94 (2007).
25 Reimagining the third-party doctrine will give the Court the flexibility it needs to
address government acquisition of third-party records generated by new technologies, such
as the CSLI at issue in Carpenter. 138 S. Ct. at 2219. As I explain in more detail in Part IV
below, the Court has tacitly acknowledged that detailed records of a person’s public and
private locations raise heightened Fourth Amendment concerns.
19
20
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acknowledged the doctrine’s limitations.26 I then argue for an end to
Miller’s time in Part II.27 While champions correctly note that a
citizen’s disclosure of information to a third party is constitutionally
relevant, abolitionists rightly respond that the doctrine must be
reworked given the modern ubiquity of data disclosures to thirdparty service providers.28 The Court should dissolve Miller’s false
dichotomy of disclosed and undisclosed third-party information,
replacing it with a two-step test informed by the sensitivity of that
information.29 In Part III, I explain that the Court can adjust the
third-party doctrine without offending principles of stare decisis,
because the doctrine, like much of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence based upon contingent privacy expectations, is
necessarily provisional.30 Finally, in Part IV, I explain how
informational sensitivity supplies the missing rationale for the
Court’s categorical approach in Carpenter. By applying that
rationale, the Court can excise Miller and chart a clear course
forward for third-party cases.31
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PATH TO MILLER
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides “the people” the right “to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”32
It is thus a uniquely public-facing criminal procedure protection.
Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections, which are
expressly directed towards individual defendants, the Fourth
Amendment grants an inviolable right to all citizens, not just those
suspected of or charged with crimes.33 “The aim of the Fourth
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
28 See infra Parts II.A and II.B.
29 See infra Parts II.C and II.D.
30 See infra Part III.
31 See infra Part IV.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33 See Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 120 (“The Fourth Amendment differs in an important
respect from the criminal procedure guarantees that immediately follow it. In the Fifth
Amendment, the rightholder is expressly made singular: ‘nor shall any person be . . .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment’s rights bearer is the singular ‘accused,’ who is granted, for example, the right
‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ But in the Fourth Amendment, the
rightholders are the people, who are ‘to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’
26
27

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss3/5

10

Gentithes: The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize Third-Pa

2019]

THE END OF MILLER’S TIME

1049

Amendment is different—the preservation of a vibrant society that
respects the freedom and autonomy of each individual.”34 Fourth
Amendment holdings are “for the innocent and guilty alike,”
protecting them all from invasions of their privacy and tranquility.35
The Supreme Court has struggled to define that broadly-granted
right. One challenge is determining what government activities
constitute an “unreasonable search and seizure” that government
investigators can conduct only after they obtain a warrant. The
Court has constructed a number of analytical artifices atop the
sparse text in an effort to answer that challenge.
The most important analytical device the Court employs is the
reasonable expectation of privacy (REOP) test.36 As I have outlined
elsewhere,37 though the Court’s early definitions of a “search”
emphasized the amendment’s relationship “to common-law
trespass,”38 the Court’s focus slowly transformed throughout the
20th century into its present-day emphasis on “people, not places.”39
In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis
highlighted that “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”40
Brandeis’s views were partially formalized nearly forty years
later in Katz v. United States, a case concerning an eavesdropping

It is not only security, but ‘the right of the people to be secure’ that vanishes when the Fourth
Amendment is read simply to prohibit ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted)).
34 SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 142.
35 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014); Gentithes, supra note 11, at 939 (“[M]illions of
Americans share a joint Fourth Amendment interest in constitutional tranquility. . . .”).
36 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
37 See Gentithes, supra note 11, at 941–44.
38 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (2012). An example of a case that used the
common-law trespass rationale is Olmstead v. United States, which held that taps attached
to telephone wires in public streets did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment simply
because none of the material things mentioned in the amendment—a citizen’s person, house,
papers or effects—were intruded upon by the government’s action. 277 U.S. 438, 463–64
(1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51.
39 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
40 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Scott E. Sundby, ‘Everyman’s’ Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1751, 1755–56 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of the founding principles of the Fourth
Amendment that Brandeis elucidated in his dissent).
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device attached to a public telephone booth.41 In a concurrence that
the Court has since applied to innumerable cases, Justice Harlan
suggested that government conduct amounts to a search triggering
the Amendment’s protections when it intrudes upon a citizen’s
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”42
Harlan said that in order for a citizen to demonstrate that
government conduct has intruded upon such a reasonable
expectation of privacy, she must in turn meet “a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”43
The REOP test is now the touchstone in determining whether
government conduct constitutes a search. Through the REOP test,
the Court can preserve traditional zones of privacy in the face of
new governmental investigative techniques. As Eleventh Circuit
Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum adeptly described:
[E]xisting Supreme Court precedent may fairly be
construed to suggest that where society has historically
recognized a legitimate expectation of privacy, we must
continue to do so for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis, even if, in our modern world, we must now
expose to a third party information that we would have
previously kept private, in order to continue to
participate fully in society. If we do not, we will face the
Hobson’s choice of leaving our historically recognized
Fourth Amendment rights at the door of the modern
world or finding ourselves locked out from it. That the
Constitution will not abide.44

389 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 361. Others have argued that modern employment of the REOP test has
eliminated the subjective prong, rendering the test wholly objective. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz
Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 113–
14 (2015).
44 United States v. Davis, 785 F. 3d 498, 527 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring);
see also Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework
for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L. J. 527, 577 (2015).
41
42
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As an analytical device, the REOP test is only equipped to check
new government search techniques based upon judges’ rough,
current impressions of what privacy protections are important
enough to maintain for the foreseeable future.45 It cannot be read
literally as an empirical measure of all citizens’ understandings of
how technology functions, and thus what information the
government can reasonably, warrantlessly obtain at any given
moment.46 There may be a “correct” answer to that inquiry, but it is
impossible to determine. Citizens vary widely in their mastery of
new technology, and their understandings are in flux as they obtain
new information or as new publicity about technological capabilities
emerges.47 The only “correct” answer would have to be derived from

45 As I discuss in more detail below, the Justice’s rulings in third-party-doctrine cases
should be considered especially provisional. See infra Part III.
46 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2245 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the circularity of a test that asks a descriptive question about society’s
expectations to answer a question that will actually shape those very expectations);
SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 121 (“Existing expectations are shaped by the police practices
that the law allows. If we decide what the law allows by looking to existing expectations, we
end up chasing ourselves in a circle. Inescapably, decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment determine what kind of privacy we are entitled to expect.” (emphasis in
original)); Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 106 (“The threat of circularity. . . is easy to see.
Suppose the President announces that all telephone conversations will henceforth be
monitored. Arguably, no one thereafter can reasonably expect privacy in his phone calls, and
the announced eavesdropping will have constitutionalized itself. The same problem will
afflict legislative and judicial pronouncements about police searches or seizures.”).
47 See Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and the Fourth Amendment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139,
188 (2016).
Societal knowledge is a complex, multilayered concept that does not lend
itself to easy application in criminal cases. Knowledge typically spreads
unevenly through the population, and attributing median societal knowledge
to criminal defendants raises questions of fundamental fairness. Judges are
societal elites who are systematically likely to overestimate the extent of
societal knowledge . . . . Further, even if societal knowledge could be
measured perfectly, anchoring the Fourth Amendment's scope to it will lead
to a gradual erosion of Fourth Amendment protection. As an increasingly
intelligent and educated population gains awareness and understanding of
new technologies and threats to privacy, expectations of privacy and the
sphere of Fourth Amendment protection will naturally shrink.
See also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”); Levinson-Waldman, supra
note 44, at 550 (“[T]echnology itself—its ubiquity, and its convenience—can dynamically
change [society’s] expectations. As people become more reliant . . . technology may seem less
intrusive, making the apparent privacy risks recede as well. A test premised on the
reasonable expectation of privacy must become more objective to account for that shift.”).
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a snapshot of all citizens at precisely the same time. Even if judges
could capture such a snapshot, a majority of popular expectations is
an inappropriate baseline for Fourth Amendment line-drawing.48
The Bill of Rights often protects minorities by limiting the
majority’s will.49 The Fourth Amendment is no different; it aims to
protect “dissidents and social outcasts” and “must not be read to
permit whatever intrusions are acceptable to those in the
conventional mainstream.”50
Furthermore, any snapshot of citizens’ understandings and
expectations may be subject to undue influence from the
government itself, which could massively publicize its intent to
regularly invade spheres of life previously considered private.51 And
society’s understanding of what is reasonable changes as citizens
decide whether the capabilities of a new technology are worth the
tradeoff in how that technology reduces our privacy, giving the
Court a moving target.52
Because the society-wide aspects of the REOP test are unstable
and perhaps unknowable, the Court’s implementations of it merely
48 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 141 (“The major aim of the Fourth Amendment—
unquestionably— is not to bolster majority rule but to afford shelter to political, religious,
and ideological minorities.”).
49 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C.L. REV. 1511, 1522 (2010)
(“[V]arious subgroups may differ in their attitudes about privacy. People’s attitudes about
privacy diverge depending upon their race, ethnicity, or religion. The Bill of Rights has oft
been championed as necessary to protect minorities by limiting the will of the majority.
[Using empirical evidence to identify reasonable expectations of privacy] would make the
Fourth Amendment too shackled to the preferences of the majority. Moreover, it would strike
many as illegitimate because the Constitution is supposed to transcend the will of the
majority at any particular moment in time.”).
50 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 120 (arguing that judges and academics should not
look to mainstream public opinion to decide what reasonable expectations of privacy are).
51 See Solove, supra note 49, at 1524 (“[T]he government could condition the populace into
expecting less privacy. For example, . . . the government could diminish expectations of
privacy by announcing on television each night that we could all be subject to electronic
surveillance.” (citation omitted)); see also Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44, at 552 (“Katz’s
approach can also put the government in an enviable position: when a technology is first
introduced, it is new, it is experimental . . . . By the time the technology is in place and publicly
revealed, and society has begun to grasp its true implications, it is too late; only an out-oftough Luddite could be said not to understand, and implicitly consent to, all its potential uses.
For the government, it is heads, we win; tails, you lose.”).
52 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“New
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and
many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the
diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves
to this development as inevitable.”).
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freezes privacy protections that the Justices deem important
enough to maintain for the foreseeable future. If the Court finds a
reasonable expectation of privacy, it means only that its sense of
what has been reasonable until today shall remain reasonable going
forward—even if technology continues to advance.53 Such judicial
estimations provide needed flexibility for Justices aiming to uphold
privacy in the face of monumental advances in technology.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

But such flexibility is accompanied by a lack of clarity that can
frustrate the Court. At times, the Justices have sought greater
predictability
in
Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence.54
Unfortunately, that approach has created bright-lines that fail to
respond to the modern world. One example is the current thirdparty doctrine.55
The Court summarized that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.56

53 The Justices are cognizant of the need to look to the forward march of investigative
capabilities given evolving technologies. “[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’” Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
54 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–92 (2014) (recognizing that police officers
must have clear, workable rules created “on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-bycase fashion” (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981))).
55 Again, I have described the evolution of this doctrine in great detail in other work. See
Gentithes, supra note 11, at 943–48. There, I noted that the doctrine first emerged in cases
concerning verbal statements made to third parties that turned out to be government
informants, situations where “the defendant presumably had exercised some discretion in
deciding who should enjoy his confidential communications.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439
(1963); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751–52 (1971)).
56 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 5

1054

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1039

The third-party doctrine is thus a blunt instrument. Rather than
acknowledge gradations in the sensitivity of information citizens
disclose to others, it provides a simple, if oft-criticized, norm:
government collection of information disclosed to non-governmental
third parties does not constitute a search subject to Fourth
Amendment requirements.57
The third-party doctrine evolved largely in two influential cases
from the 1970s—Miller58 and Smith v. Maryland.59 First, in Miller,
government investigators obtained financial records of two accounts
from a defendant’s bank via an admittedly defective subpoena,
including microfilm records for each account, “all checks, deposit
slips, two financial statements, and three monthly statements.”60
The defendant challenged the admission of his bank records as the
fruit of an unlawful search.61 The Supreme Court held that because
“[a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial statements and
deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business,” there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in those
records, and thus the government did not conduct a search when it
collected them.62 The defendant assumed the risk that third-party
bankers would reveal his sensitive financial information to the
government, tacitly consenting to such disclosures.63
Three years later in Smith, police officers warrantlessly asked a
telephone company to install a pen register device in its central
offices to record the numbers dialed from the home phone of a man
suspected of robbing and later harassing a Baltimore woman.64 That
device “disclos[ed] only the telephone numbers that [the defendant].
. . dialed.”65 The Court held that the government’s installation of
that device did not constitute a search because the defendant had
57 For a brief summation of critiques of the third-party doctrine, see Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 n.5 (2009).
58 425 U.S. at 435.
59 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
60 Miller, 425 U.S. at 438.
61 See id. at 436.
62 Id. at 442.
63 Id. at 443. Another rationale underlying Miller was the fact that banks traditionally
kept these records, so the government’s effort to collect them was not a “novel means designed
to circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 444.
64 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
65 Id. at 741.
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed and
thereby disclosed to a third party.66 Telephone users “typically know
that they must convey numerical information to the phone
company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.”67 Thus,
the government was not required to obtain a warrant prior to
collecting such information through a pen register, because the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information in the first place.68
B. LIMITS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

Miller (and, to a lesser extent, Smith) suggests an unlimited
investigative technique for government investigators in today’s
world. Miller implies that investigators can warrantlessly obtain
any information a citizen discloses to a third-party service provider,
no matter how sensitive the information is or how detailed an
informational mosaic of the citizen it may paint.69 But as expansive
as the third-party doctrine seems, it always had inherent limits.
Contrary to champions’ arguments,70 the third-party doctrine was

Id. at 743–46 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44).
Id. at 743.
68 Id. at 745–46. Justice Marshall vigorously dissented from the majority’s assumption of
the risk rationale in Smith. Marshall noted that
66
67

[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice . . . .
By contrast here, unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many
has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept
the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.
Id. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465–66
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
69 Cf. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 68–69; Kerr, supra note 18, at 313 (“Under the
mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as
individual steps.”).
70 Justice Kennedy summarized this absolute view of the third-party doctrine in his
dissent in Carpenter. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that
information was relinquished to a third party was the entire basis for concluding that the
defendants in [Miller and Smith] lack a reasonable expectation of privacy. Miller and Smith
do not establish [any] kind of category-by-category balancing . . . .”).
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never a limitless rule that every datum provided to a third party
was warrantlessly available to the government.71
For instance, while investigators can warrantlessly collect dialed
telephone numbers,72 they cannot collect the words spoken in the
subsequent conversation, which are also provided to third parties.73
Similarly, the government cannot warrantlessly collect medical
information disclosed to third-party doctors: “The reasonable
expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing
diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will
not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”74
Nor can investigators search a suspect’s hotel room without a
warrant, despite the fact that third-party housekeepers or
maintenance people may have accessed the room or even moved the
suspect’s belongings.75 Fourth Amendment protections also extend

71 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 527–28 (11th. Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J.,
concurring) (“Supreme Court precedent fairly may be read to suggest that the third-party
doctrine must be subordinate to expectations of privacy that society has historically
recognized as reasonable. Indeed, our privacy expectations in modern-day hotels and the
content of our telephone conversations hearken back to historically recognized reasonable
expectations of privacy.”); Kerr, supra note 15, at 1038 (“The claim that rights in the contents
of communications should be waived under the third-party doctrine does not work because
the same argument could be made about telephone calls and postal letters. A person who
makes a telephone call discloses the contents of the call to the phone company: the electrical
signal travels by wire to the phone company and the phone company routes the call to its
destination. Katz established that the third-party doctrine does not apply in that setting.”).
72 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46 .
73 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402) (“People
disclose the content of telephone calls to third parties. But we said the government can’t
intrude without a warrant in that situation.”).
74 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 23, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402) (“We limited it when—in Bond and
Ferguson when we said police can’t get your medical records without your consent, even
though you’ve disclosed your medical records to doctors at a hospital.”).
75 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 527 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held
that ‘[a] hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a
home or an office.’ This is so, even though housekeepers and maintenance people commonly
have access to hotel rooms during a guest’s stay and can view and even move around a guest’s
belongings in order to conduct their duties. But the fact that a hotel guest has exposed his or
her belongings to hotel workers does not, in and of itself, entitle the government to enter a
rented hotel room and conduct a warrantless search.” (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 95–96 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)))); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990)); see also United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Hotel guests, for example, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their rooms. This is so even though maids routinely enter hotel
rooms to replace the towels and tidy the furniture. Similarly, tenants have a legitimate
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to a suspect’s rental apartment, “even though his landlord has the
right to conduct unannounced inspections at any time.”76
Each of these limitations on the third-party doctrine seems to
carry its own inherent logic—the prospect of government collection
of phone conversations, medical data, or the contents of hotel rooms
is especially unsettling in its own unique way. The Court’s
technique in each case was also consistent; it categorically excluded
some types of data from warrantless collection, even after it had
been disclosed to a third party. But much as it failed to announce a
clear rationale for excepting a week’s worth of CSLI from the thirdparty doctrine in Carpenter, the Court failed to supply a justification
for its earlier categorical exceptions to the doctrine.
The Court might have formed a coherent sensitivity rationale for
categories of data that are, at least in some amounts, excepted from
the third-party doctrine. It could have noted that some information,
like the contents of our conversations or the medical data our doctor
collects, is simply too sensitive to be stripped of all protection
immediately upon disclosure to a third party. That rationale would
fit snugly with the Court’s trepidation about subjecting CSLI to the
third-party doctrine in any amount given its “deeply revealing
nature . . . its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the
inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.”77 Such a
sensitivity rationale was even clear to the dissenting Justices in
Carpenter.78
Yet despite the potential clarity the Carpenter majority could
have achieved by announcing a sensitivity rationale for its
categorical approach to the third-party doctrine, it demurred, apart
from vaguely referencing the “unique nature” of CSLI’s “intimate
window” into a customer’s life.79 Why would the majority avoid
clearly announcing that certain categories of information are too

expectation of privacy in their apartments. That expectation persists, regardless of the
incursions of handymen to fix leaky faucets.” (citations omitted)).
76 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) quoted in
SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 131.
77 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
78 Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Today the Court suggests that Smith and Miller
distinguish between kinds of information disclosed to third parties and require courts to
decide whether to ‘extend’ those decisions to particular classes of information, depending on
their sensitivity.” (emphasis in original)).
79 Id. at 2217, 2232.
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sensitive to be subject to an absolutist version of the third-party
doctrine? Because that rationale faces an awkward hurdle: the
obvious sensitivity of the financial information the Court ruled
wholly unprotected in Miller. As Justice Kennedy noted in dissent
in Carpenter, Miller-style financial information seems at least as
sensitive as CSLI; they are of “vast scope,” including
“comprehensive account[s] of almost every transaction an
individual makes on a daily basis” that is accessible “[w]ith just the
click of a button” and “at practically no expense.”80
As I argue in the next part, the time has come to remove that
hurdle by ending Miller’s time and announcing that sensitivity
matters. The Court can then follow the outline of Carpenter and
analyze the sensitivity of categories of information disclosed to third
parties using a formal framework capable of clear, consistent
application. Below, I prescribe a two-step method for that
formalization of the categorical approach to the third-party
doctrine, based upon informational sensitivity.
II. THE END OF MILLER’S TIME
Miller has always had its opponents, even amongst the Justices
who heard the case. But that opposition has been focused primarily
on abolition of the third-party doctrine as a whole. These
abolitionist arguments typically challenge the Court’s claim that
citizens “voluntarily” disclose information to third parties that
provide practically necessary services, like financial institutions or
telecommunications providers. In this section, I propose a more
lasting critique to adjust, rather than abolish, the third-party
doctrine, based upon the inherent sensitivity of some types of
information that citizens relay to third parties.
A. INVOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK

In his dissent in Miller, Justice Brennan criticized the majority’s
rationale that bank customers voluntarily assume that risk of thirdparty disclosure.81 As Brennan noted, “[f]or all practical purposes,
the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial
80
81

Id. at 2232–33. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 448–51 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without
maintaining a bank account.”82 Thus, Brennan asserted that bank
customers reasonably believe that the financial information they
disclose “will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking
purposes,” absent compulsion by legal process.83
The assumption of the risk rationale met similar resistance from
some Justices in Smith three years later. There, Justice Stewart
questioned whether “there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the numbers dialed because the caller assumes the risk that the
telephone company will disclose them to the police.”84 Further,
Justice Marshall noted that
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some
notion of choice. . . . By contrast here, unless a person is
prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but
accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of
‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical
matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.85
These critiques were echoed again in Carpenter, but this time in
the majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the use
of cell phones is “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life
that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern

Id. at 451.
Id. at 449.
84 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 747 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In the years since Smith,
these critiques have been repeated in the academic literature. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 4, at std. 25-4.1(a) (stating that transferring information to third parties is
“reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society”); BARRY FRIEDMAN,
UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 236 (2017) (“‘Voluntarily’ is the trick word
here . . . . [I]n today’s world we have little choice but to give our most intimate information to
third parties all the time.”); Price, supra note 6, at 267 (“It is . . . impossible to fully participate
in modern economic life without involving a bank to execute transactions. Because this thirdparty interaction is unavoidable, it undermines the assumption of risk rationale.”); Kerr &
Nojeim, supra note 6 (“If you want to communicate efficiently today, your communications
likely will go through your ISP’s servers. The alternative means of communication either
involve conveying information to other third parties, or traveling to the other communicant
so you can have a personal chat. Consent in this context has little meaning.”).
82
83
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society.”86 Cell phones generate CSLI through “[v]irtually any
activity on the phone.”87 Thus, a cell phone user does not
meaningfully assume the risk of disclosure of that information to
third parties, including government agents.88
An important distinction arises, though, in the Carpenter
majority’s use of the critique. There, the Court used the critique to
suggest that the third-party doctrine should be limited, rather than
to propose its abolition. Rightly so. Critiques of the assumption-ofthe-risk rationale do not eliminate a kernel of truth at the thirdparty doctrine’s core. Orin Kerr describes this as the “eyewitness
rule”—the idea that there is no Fourth Amendment right
preventing others from telling the government what they have seen
or heard about you.89 Critics often fail to acknowledge that when we
disclose information to others—even if that disclosure is mundane
and practically necessary—nothing prohibits those others from
violating our trust and relaying that information again.90 Claims
that the third-party doctrine is wholly invalid because such
disclosures are practically involuntary disregard that kernel of
truth. Entirely overruling the doctrine is strong medicine—perhaps
too strong for police investigators, or the rationale underlying this
area of jurisprudence, to bear.
B. SENSITIVITY MATTERS

I prescribe a more measured adjustment to the third-party
doctrine, one that would supplement the categorical approach
described in the Carpenter majority with a clear, workable
rationale. My prescription is based upon a secondary strand to
Brennan’s Miller dissent. Brennan noted the sensitivity of the
information at issue, recognizing that “the totality of bank records
provides a virtual current biography” of the customer.91 In other
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018) (quotation omitted).
Id. at 2220.
88 Id.
89 Kerr, supra note 4.
90 The Court showed its understanding of that idea in Hoffa v. United States, in which the
court permitted the government to warrantlessly obtain information from a third-party
witness in whom the defendant had confided. 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). Similarly, the ABA’s
proposed standards on law enforcement access to third party records highlight the resonance
of the third-party rationale. Supra note 4.
91 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86
87
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words, there is something constitutionally relevant about the very
nature of financial information, separate and apart from how that
information was disclosed and to whom.
Informational sensitivity explains why Miller, though important
in establishing the logic of the third-party doctrine, contains a
holding about financial information that is actually a third-partydoctrine outlier.92 Critics of the doctrine are not worried about each
and every mundane data point that might be collected from a thirdparty, but instead about the particular sensitivity of some of the
data points inevitably included in government data dragnets.93
Some data points are particularly sensitive, and ought to enjoy
constitutional protection even if disclosed to a third party. Some
pieces of information are particularly disturbing to citizens when
disclosed by a third party, such as the trip to the abortion clinic or
the choice to worship in a community of faith.94 When the
government obtains such sensitive information from a third party,
it raises heightened Fourth Amendment concerns, especially in
light of the possibility that bad government actors could improperly
manipulate that information.95
Informational sensitivity was also at the core of the Carpenter
majority’s discomfort with warrantless collection of CSLI, though it
was not clearly expressed in the opinion. Over and over, the
majority emphasized that “CSLI is an entirely different species of
business record,” one that “provides an intimate window into a

92 See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 566 (“Underlying the protection of most persons, homes,
papers, effects, and expectations of privacy is a concern for personal information—
information that allows for self-expression, autonomy, association, religion, liberty, family,
and security.” (citation omitted)).
93 See Priscilla J. Smith, Much Ado About Mosaics: How Original Principles Apply to
Evolving Technology in United States v. Jones, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 557, 580–81 (2013) (“The
most common examples of [GPS] technology’s intrusiveness involve the possibility that
certain information will be obtained—information that is found on just one ‘tile’ in the mosaic
and that can be gathered from just one trip.”). Thus, there exists “a broader concern that
Government spying could lead to a world in which the government needs only to run a quick
search through the database to find something—just one thing—you wish it had not seen.”
Id. at 581.
94 See id. at 581.
95 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 24, at 195 (“A separate concern about event-driven data
mining is that because it can cast such a wide net, it is easier to manipulate in the service of
illegitimate ends. In particular, it might facilitate both harassment of disfavored groups . . .
and pretextual searches for evidence of nonprofiled crimes that the government would
otherwise have difficulty discovering or proving. . . .”).
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person’s life” and is “exhaustive” and “distinct” from other
information disclosed to third parties.96
These gestures towards the sensitivity of CSLI are vital to
reshaping the third-party doctrine. Long-term location information
about nearly every citizen, which can recreate our paths in the
world for as long as cell phone companies preserve their records, are
acutely sensitive. The Carpenter majority’s analysis sought to
balance that informational sensitivity with the kernel of truth at
the third-party doctrine’s core. Incorporating informational
sensitivity expressly into the Court’s analysis would more aptly
describe the relevant considerations when government
investigators begin to acquire new types of digital information in
bulk.
Sensitivity matters because it shows why government collection
of massive troves of some informational categories amounts to a
search, while government collection of individual data points may
not. If some types of information are inherently sensitive, then
warrantless government collection of enough of that information
can violate the Fourth Amendment under the “mosaic theory” (also
known as the “quantitative theory”) of the Fourth Amendment.97
The mosaic theory posits that citizens have reasonable
expectations of privacy “in certain quantities of information and
data even if [they] lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the
constituent parts of [the] whole.”98 Thus, though prior jurisprudence
permits the government to warrantlessly collect individual data
points—say, individual pieces of your trash99—the mosaic theory
provides that the government must obtain a warrant if it collects

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2219 (2018).
Cf. Smith, supra note 93, at 560–61 (arguing that “[u]nder a ruling that relied solely on
the mosaic theory, surveillance would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy whenever
it collected individual pieces of information about a person’s location” because of the
sensitivity of the information (emphasis in original)).
98 David Gray & Danielle K. Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential
of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 390 (2013). For
a more detailed explanation of the origins of the mosaic theory, see Gray & Citron, supra note
18, at 68–69 (describing a more interwoven approach as compared to the once “theoretically
and practically discrete” fields of information privacy law and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence); Kerr, supra note 18, at 313 (explaining the cases that gave rise to the theory).
99 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the
curtilage of a home).
96
97
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enough of those data points to paint a (perhaps messy) picture of
your life.
The mosaic theory is open to attack on the grounds that no
quantity of absolute non-searches could ever equal a search.100 But
that attack is premised upon a reading of the third-party doctrine
in absolute, binary terms, such that government collection of
individual data points is either 100% or 0% of a search. That hard
rule has long been eroded around its edges, and the Carpenter
majority continued that erosion.101 The Court’s jurisprudence
concerning some types of information, such as the contents of
conversations or diagnostic medical testing, suggests an evolution
in the doctrine.102 Though the foundational insight that disclosure
to others is constitutionally relevant remains, the doctrine has
progressed from a hard rule to a flexible standard. The Court should
further this progression by explicitly examining the sensitivity of
the information at issue in third-party doctrine cases.
There is a continuum of sensitivity upon which data falls, which
in turn dictates varying expectations of privacy in that data even
after it has been disclosed to a third party. On one end is pure metadata with no inherent meaning, such as the dialed phone numbers
in Smith. On the other end are extremely sensitive data-points,
such as medical information in the control of health care
professionals. In the middle are a number of categories that carry
some inherent magnitude of sensitivity, data that inherently
conveys some miniscule amount of meaning. Citizens harbor some
miniscule reasonable expectation of privacy in that data, such that
an aggregation of those miniscule integers can amount to a search
for which the government must first obtain a warrant, even if a
citizen disclosed that data to a third party.103
100 For a discussion of this problem, and one possible solution to it, see Gentithes, supra
note 11, at 958–60. Unlike my position in that Article, my argument here is that individual
citizens rightly retain a miniscule expectation of privacy in location data points, such that a
sufficient accumulation of those greater-than-zero invasions of privacy amounts to a single
search.
101 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
103 Even Professor Orin Kerr, a long-time defender of the third-party doctrine, has
acknowledged that Fourth Amendment cases involving emerging data-collection technologies
should be controlled by the type of data at issue, rather than how the government collected
it. According to Kerr, “[i]n areas of new technology, the details of how the information is
collected can be contingent and unstable. Focusing a rule on the kind of information that is
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Other scholars have attempted to categorize information on a
sliding scale. For instance, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson has proposed
a continuum to distinguish between protected and unprotected data
emanating from digital “smart” devices. According to Ferguson:
The analysis would necessarily work along a
continuum, with little to no protection for information
freely shared with others (commenting through a public
Twitter account), to more protection for users who
controlled locational data access, restricted data
sharing, and used encrypted services, to absolute
protection for people technologically savvy enough to
use key encryption or establish contractual
arrangements to secure data.104
Michael W. Price has also argued that the binary classification
created by the third-party doctrine is problematic in the modern
world. As he puts it, “sharing digital data is not an all-or-nothing
endeavor; it is more like a sliding scale that users may control
(although not always with success).”105
The most nuanced of these sliding scale efforts was the American
Bar Association’s 2012 Proposed Standards for Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records, which claims that courts and
legislatures should consider the “privacy” of information that the
government collects.106 The ABA’s proposal labeled all types of
information as either highly private, moderately private, minimally
private, or not private.107 Courts could implement this sliding scale
based upon consideration of whether:
(a) the initial transfer of such information to an
institutional third party is reasonably necessary to

collected, rather than the details of how it is collected, is often a more stable and consistent
approach.” Orin Kerr, The Best Way to Rule for Carpenter (Or, How to Expand Fourth
Amendment Protections Without Making a Mess), LAWFARE (Dec. 29, 2017, 6:03 AM),
https://lawfareblog.com/best-way-rule-carpenter-or-how-expand-fourth-amendmentprotections-without-making-mess.
104 Ferguson, supra note 12, at 621–22.
105 Price, supra note 6, at 268.
106 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at std. 25-4.1.
107 Id.
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participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or
is socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and
association;
(b) such information is personal, including the extent to
which it is intimate and likely to cause embarrassment
or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside of the initial
transfer to an institutional third party it is typically
disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all;
(c) such information is accessible to and accessed by
non-government persons outside the institutional third
party; and
(d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts
or allows access to and dissemination of such
information or of comparable information.108
My informational sensitivity view takes a new perspective on
such efforts, directly responding to the Carpenter Court’s expressed
interest in a categorical third-party doctrine by establishing a
continuum of informational sensitivity. Unlike the ABA’s emphasis
upon the “personal” and potentially stigmatizing nature of
information,109 my view emphasizes the substantive meaning that
information conveys on its face, irrespective of the stigma that
meaning may carry.110 By emphasizing whether investigators can
instantaneously draw conclusions about citizens based upon a mere
glance at the information at issue, my view focuses on objective
characteristics of the information, rather than the stigma
associated with informational categories that judges either would
have to assume or would have to learn through significant empirical
research.111
I suggest that when determining placement on my proposed
continuum of informational sensitivity, the Court look to other
developments in its own jurisprudence that suggest special

Id.
See id.
110 See infra Part II.C.
111 As noted earlier, such explicitly empirical approaches to the third-party doctrine appear
difficult, if not impossible, to operationalize. See supra note 47.
108
109
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constitutional protection for that category of information.112 As
detailed in the next subsection, my informational sensitivity
continuum uses a two-step framework to expressly incorporate the
mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment only for information that
has some inherent sensitivity at the first step.113 While the ABA’s
proposal leaves unanswered whether collection of information
labeled “not private” could ever amount to a search, my proposal
expressly excludes collection of non-sensitive information from
classification as a search, no matter how much of that information
the government collected.114
This view is consistent with my earlier work on the mosaic theory
and constitutional tranquility. I have argued that government data
dragnets that collect completely innocuous, non-sensitive
information about all citizens can still be a search.115 Citizens share
an interest in constitutional tranquility, an under-theorized
concept116 grounded in the Constitution’s text117 and in Justice
Brandeis’s conception of the primary aim of the Fourth Amendment
112 See infra Part II.C.1. In contrast, the ABA’s approach looks more to legislative sources
of law to determine the privacy of information. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at std. 254.1.
113 See infra Part II.C.2.
114 See id.
115 Gentithes, supra note 11, at 961 (“[E]ach government action is an infringement upon
the tranquility implicit in the Fourth Amendment, and a sufficient aggregation of such
infringement is a search.”).
116 See id. at 961
[C]onstitutional tranquility . . . implies a level of peace and quiet in our daily
affairs, and suggests that the default position of government is one of
inaction, not aggressive intrusion into citizens’ lives . . . . It makes no
difference if the government effort is unknown to citizens; the tranquil
foundation of life in a free republic is disrupted by the activity itself, not by
its effect upon citizens' consciousness. The disruption impairs constitutional
tranquility.
117 Tranquility is one of the overarching purposes of the Constitution, given expression in
its preamble, promising to “insure domestic Tranquility.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. See also
Gentithes, supra note 11, at 962
Constitutional tranquility is reflected in the text beyond the Fourth
Amendment . . . . The Third Amendment’s prohibition against the
unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of
privacy from governmental intrusion. Even more, to some extent, the Fifth
Amendment too reflects the Constitution’s concern for the right of each
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. These
textual assurances depend on a baseline level of undisturbed domestic
tranquility.
Quotations and citations omitted.
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as protecting “the right to be let alone.”118 That shared tranquility
interest can be undermined by the collection of data points in which
citizens have absolutely no reasonable expectation of privacy—such
as the phone numbers they dial.119 The collection of each data point
is a “greater-than-zero intrusion” upon our shared tranquility
interests, and those intrusions can be aggregated to the point that
a data dragnet constitutes a search—such as where a dragnet
captures data about practically everyone engaged in a ubiquitous
activity like dialing a phone.120
In contrast, my argument here is that individual citizens rightly
retain a miniscule expectation of privacy in sensitive data points.
Thus, each collection of those sensitive data points is a greater-thanzero invasion of privacy. And a sufficient accumulation of those
greater-than-zero invasions of privacy amounts to a single search.
My view also answers one of Orin Kerr’s primary concerns with
mosaic theory—that citizens cannot maintain an expectation of
privacy in data amassed at discrete intervals, such as several nonconsecutive weeks of banking information spread over several
years.121 So long as there is some minimal expectation of privacy in
each individual datum the government collects, whether it collected
the data points over a consecutive period is irrelevant. The
amalgamation of those individual data points, each of which carries
some magnitude of inherent sensitivity, can amount to a positive
integer, and in turn can amount to a single Fourth Amendment
search.
My approach is an important supplement to current practice
signaled by the Carpenter majority. Rather than preserving the
myth that all information citizens disclose to third parties is
stripped entirely of constitutional protection—a myth the Court has
long undermined,122 and which it all but buried in Carpenter123—my
approach disposes of Miller’s false dichotomy and replaces it with a
continuum that explains the Justices’ discomfort in many recent
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Gentithes, supra note 11, at 959.
120 Id. at 963.
121 See Kerr, supra note 18, at 334.
122 See supra Part I.B.
123 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“Given the unique nature of
cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by
itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
118
119
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third-party-doctrine cases. Sensitivity provides the missing
rationale around which a majority of the Justices can coalesce when
expressing their discomfort with an absolutist third-party doctrine.
It explains how the old third-party-doctrine approach may be “ill
suited to the digital age,”124 but a refined doctrine can still retain
salience in the many cases where the government obtains only a few
data points about relatively non-sensitive information. And as I
explain below, it is an approach the Court can apply over time to
emerging technologies as part of a good-faith, workable effort to set
proper limits for the third-party doctrine.
C. TWO-STEP TEST FOR INFORMATIONAL SENSITIVITY

My approach will require the Court, in cases where the
government obtained large amounts of data from a third party, to
undertake a two-step test to determine whether a warrant was
required. As noted above, it is thus a more formalized, and more
judicially manageable, approach to categorizing information than
previous efforts at determining the Fourth Amendment protection
based upon a sliding scale of privacy.125
In the first step, the Court should determine the sensitivity of
that information, placing it on a sensitivity continuum rather than
a false dichotomy between disclosed and undisclosed information.
This approach will allow the Carpenter majority’s categorical
approach to the third-party doctrine to evolve in a straightforward,
workable fashion—and away from a hard rule that fails, as the
Court itself has acknowledged, for some categories of information.126
Several sources can determine informational sensitivity: the Court’s
own treatment of the category of information at issue in other
decisions that touch upon it, in the criminal context or elsewhere;
the substantive meaning that the information conveys on its face;
and the relative voluntariness of the disclosure of that information
in contemporary society.
In the second step, the Court should decide whether the
government has collected enough sensitive information to create an
informational mosaic of the citizen, thereby conducting a search.
124
125
126

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
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Citizens have a small but cognizable expectation of privacy in many
data points that a third party collects, depending upon the data’s
relative sensitivity. Though government collection of one or even
several intermediately sensitive data points may not raise
constitutional concern, if the government collects enough of them, it
creates such a detailed picture of the citizen’s life that it has
conducted a search for which it must usually obtain a warrant.
1. Step One: Determining Sensitivity
The first step will require the Court to place the information at
issue on a continuum of sensitivity. To make that determination,
the Court can initially consider other developments in its own
jurisprudence that shed light upon the question. Where the Court’s
decisions in other areas have suggested that such information is of
unique constitutional concern, the Court should place that category
of information near the sensitive end of the continuum. In the
following subsection, I discuss two examples where the Court has
indicated such unique constitutional concerns—financial
transactions like those at issue in Miller and reading record
concerns that it has raised in other contexts.127 The Court can look
for such developments when deciding whether information is
sensitive enough to warrant some Fourth Amendment protection
under my proposal.
When determining sensitivity, the Court can also consider the
level of substantive meaning inherent in the information at issue.
For instance, while raw data like telephone numbers conveys
relatively little substantive detail, a history of financial
transactions, which might indicate the products, costs, and vendors
in thousands of commercial interactions, conveys far more meaning.
Information with such an inherent vector of substantive meaning is
more sensitive and more likely to fall on the sensitive end of the
continuum.
Information that conveys greater facial meaning is more
sensitive, and hence more constitutionally protected under my
theory, because even local authorities with limited data-aggregation
capabilities can readily discern the intimate details of a suspect’s
life after collecting just a few such data points. My position offers

127

See infra Part II.D.
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heightened protection for such facially sensitive data. That
heightened protection ensures that in local investigations of most
criminal offenses, government agents will not be able to readily
assemble intimate portraits of suspects without a warrant.
The Court’s sensitivity determinations can also account for the
relative voluntariness of the disclosure. As outlined above, one
refrain in critiques of the third-party doctrine is that citizens cannot
assume the risk of third-party disclosures where they have no choice
but to utilize third-party services to survive in the modern world.128
Though that critique does not defeat the third-party doctrine’s
insight that disclosure is still constitutionally relevant, it is not an
irrelevant consideration in Fourth Amendment analysis. As the
Court intimated in Carpenter,129 the relative voluntariness of a
disclosure can play a meaningful role in informing the Court’s
sensitivity judgments during the first step of my test.
Though the Court will need to rely upon its own value judgments
to some extent to determine the sensitivity of information, it can
also rely upon the arguments fleshed out by parties and amici to
fully comprehend technological advances and the ubiquity of data
disclosures. Interested parties can explain the frequency, depth,
and detail of citizens’ disclosures of a particular category of
information to third-party service providers. For instance, the
arguments might show, in the case of Miller-style financial
information, how detailed and meaningful bank records of consumer
transactions are in today’s society.130
Even with these sources in hand, the Court will likely find bright
lines elusive. But the lack of bright lines is acceptable for this aspect
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. To be clear, I only suggest
that the Court consider informational sensitivity when the
government has collected information from third parties, and only
then to determine whether warrantless collection is permissible
under the third-party doctrine. I do not contend here that
128 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at std. 25-4.1(a); FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 237; Price, supra
note 6, at 267; Kerr & Nojeim, supra note 6.
129 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2208 (2018) (discussing the
voluntariness of cell phone location data disclosure). My position aligns with the Carpenter
majority’s approach, which included the suggestion that the third-party doctrine did not fully
apply to CSLI because customers did not meaningfully make voluntary disclosures of it. Id.
130 See infra notes 158–159 and accompanying text.
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informational sensitivity is a vital component in the Court’s broader
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
One might object that informational sensitivity is far too
indeterminate to form the basis of a constitutional rule.131 If
Justices must rely, even in part, upon their own values to determine
the sensitivity of, and hence level of Fourth Amendment protection
for, categories of disclosed information, jurisprudence in this area
will be reduced to nine people’s rudderless assumptions about
technology and consumer habits. But while informational
sensitivity is a messy continuum, fleshing out that continuum, at
least on a provisional basis while new technology emerges,132 is
worthwhile. A genuine effort to craft such a tentative rule is vital to
the public’s perception that the Court is upholding the Fourth
Amendment’s protections afforded to all of “the people,” not just the
criminal defendants in the Court’s headline third-party-doctrine
cases.133 That process, though messy, will demonstrate the Court’s
good-faith, nuanced effort to protect citizens’ widespread disclosures
of data to third-party service providers in an appropriate way.
2. Step Two: Sensitivity and Mosaics
Where the Court determines that the information collected had
some sensitivity, it should proceed to the second step of the test.
Again, the second step is unnecessary if the information is not
sensitive. Pure metadata like telephone numbers dialed may not be
sensitive, and the government may warrantlessly collect it in bulk
without violating expectations of privacy.134 But if the information
is sensitive, the Court should determine whether the government
has collected enough of it to create an informational mosaic of the
citizen. Depending upon where the information falls on the
sensitivity continuum and how much the government has obtained,
the Court can then determine whether the government’s conduct
131 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (commenting that he “do[es] not
know and the court does not say” what sensitive means).
132 See infra Part IV. The Court can adjust course with a freer hand than in most areas of
jurisprudence in the future as both citizens and service providers offer new uses for and
perspectives upon different types of data.
133 See U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see also supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
134 But see Gentithes, supra note 11, at 960–66 (presenting an alternative theory of why
the limitless collection of pure metadata may nonetheless violate citizens’ rights to
constitutional tranquility).
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amounted to a search under the mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment.135
Importantly, the government can warrantlessly collect one or
even several data points of a person’s most sensitive information.
Aside from a few categories of extremely sensitive data, such as the
medical records the Court has already excepted from the third-party
doctrine,136 the government may still warrantlessly collect most
individual data points. All the Court needs to determine at this step
is whether the government has assembled enough sensitive data
points to paint a detailed picture of a citizen’s life, and therefore
conducted a search for which a warrant is required in spite of the
third-party doctrine.
This position dovetails with the Carpenter majority’s limited
holding, which applies only to the collection of at least seven days’
of CSLI and not to “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of
information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site
during a particular interval).”137 That distinction’s logic draws upon
the relative sensitivity of CSLI—more so than Smith’s telephone
metadata, but less than completely excluded third-party
information like medical diagnostic test results.138 Thus, collection
of a few data points of CSLI, or of single data points of multiple
citizens in one area at a specific time, might be permissible under
the second step of my proposed analysis.
Police officers and government investigators may find it difficult
to determine the threshold for collection of sensitive information ex
ante.139 That difficulty is acceptable. Again, government
investigators need not hesitate to collect individual data points of

135 See supra Part II.B; Gray & Citron, supra note 98, at 390 (describing the mosaic theory
of Fourth Amendment privacy and the primary objections to it); Gray & Citron, supra note
18, at 68–69 (discussing the practical implementation of recognizing citizens’ “right to expect
that certain quantities of information about them will remain private”); Kerr, supra note 18,
at 313 (noting that five justices of the Supreme Court appear to endorse “some form” of the
mosaic theory).
136 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 23, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (“We limited
it when—in Bond and Ferguson when we said police can’t get your medical records without
your consent, even though you’ve disclosed your medical records to doctors at a hospital.”).
137 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (describing the Court’s decision as “a narrow one”).
138 See id. at 2216–17 (distinguishing Smith by the detail and comprehensiveness of the
information collected).
139 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 229.
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almost all categories of data.140 It is only when investigators seek
extensive third-party records of sensitive information, as part of
their own extended investigations—not as part of the rapid-fire, lifeand-death decisions officers often must make in the field—that the
investigators must first obtain judicial approval.141 Giving
government agents some hesitation in those scenarios is not a bug,
but a desirable feature. The extra investigation and paperwork that
might be involved if officers, uncertain of the level of protection that
a category of information might receive upon later judicial review,
decide to seek an unnecessary warrant in order to obtain troves of
sensitive data about citizens is a fair price to pay for greater
society’s privacy.142
D. SENSITIVITY IN PRACTICE

In this subsection, I demonstrate how the Court might apply the
two-step sensitivity test I propose in two examples. First, I consider
the financial information at issue in Miller, concluding that the
Court incorrectly allowed the government unlimited warrantless
access to that information, even if that decision validly established
the third-party doctrine’s intellectual underpinnings. I then apply
my test to a hypothetical case concerning emerging issues for digital
reading records in libraries.
1. Financial Information
Though Miller remains a vital component of the third-party
doctrine’s origins, the particular holding it reached concerning
warrantless access to unlimited amounts of financial information is
flawed. The Miller court permitted the government to obtain “all
records”—including checks, deposit slips, financial statements, and
monthly statements—pertaining to multiple accounts the
defendant held at two banks during a four-month period.143 Under

140 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (noting that information gathered by third parties is
still entitled to Fourth Amendment protections).
141 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
142 “To the extent law enforcement wants greater clarity in any given case, there is an easy
answer: get a warrant. In many of the cases in which courts have waved a green flag at the
police after the fact, a warrant would have been utterly obtainable . . . . If the government
can get a warrant in close cases, it should.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 229.
143 425 U.S. 435, 437–38, 443 (1976).
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my two-step test for the informational sensitivity of government
records, that holding is dubious.
Under the first step, such financial information is highly
sensitive. Several other decisions from the Court suggest that
financial information is a constitutionally sensitive category. For
instance, in its recent opinion in Riley v. California,144 the Court
acknowledged that “certain types of data are . . . qualitatively
different.”145 It started by noting that internet search histories and
detailed records of a person’s public and private locations “could
reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns,”146 adding that
“[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and
descriptions.”147 The Court specifically acknowledged that limitless
collection of financial data stored in a digital device might raise
Fourth Amendment concerns.148 According to the Court, “[t]he fact
that someone could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket
does not justify a search of every bank statement from the last five
years.”149 The Court thus recognized that financial information is
sensitive enough to garner some Fourth Amendment protection.
Similarly, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence suggests
that financial information is particularly sensitive. In the landmark
Buckley v. Valeo decision, the Court ruled that spending money to
influence elections is a form of constitutionally-protected free
speech.150 According to the Court, “virtually every means of
communicating ideas in . . . mass society,” at least since 1976,
“requires the expenditure of money.”151 The Court thus “equated
money with speech and hence concluded that restrictions on
spending could harm speech rights severely.”152 Applying the logic

144 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (holding that police officers cannot warrantlessly search
digital information on a cell phone seized incident to arrest).
145 Id. at 2490.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 2489. Thus, in the digital age, people commonly carry “a cache of sensitive
personal information” in their pockets—their cell phones. Id. at 2490.
148 See id. at 2485.
149 Id. at 2493.
150 See 424 U.S. 1, 16–20 (1976).
151 Id. at 19.
152 Jessica A. Levinson, The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v. Valeo
is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881, 933 (2012). For a summary of the Court’s jurisprudence
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of Buckley,153 some financial transactions likely to be captured
through a Miller-style subpoena are equivalent to protected First
Amendment activity.154 Though political donations are typically
reported to the Federal Election Commission,155 the Court’s
longstanding concern about government regulation of the free flow
of financial transactions equated with speech highlights the special
sensitivity of data about those transactions. The government simply
cannot examine all the spending habits of citizens without
eventually examining the contents of communications—that is,
without examining money that has been spent to advance speech.156
The Court’s holdings in Riley and Buckley suggest that financial
information collected by the government should receive some
Fourth Amendment protection. That suggestion is supported by the
substantive meaning financial information conveys on its face. The
full records of a bank customer’s accounts convey something
substantive to the reader. They may reveal sensitive details about
the commercial interactions the bank customer has with political
parties, medical professionals, paramours, or therapists. As the
American Bar Association has noted, “[h]ow much we spend, where
we spend it, when we spend it, and on what are paradigm examples
of intimate information.”157
The substantive content of information maintained by financial
institutions has also increased over time. At the time of Miller,
financial institutions’ records included deposit slips and cancelled

equating money and speech, at least in the political arena, see id. at 890–904 and Jed
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 801–07 (2001).
153 424 U.S. at 18–19.
154 Cf. Slobogin, supra note 5, at 2 (“The capacity of computers to access, store, and analyze
data has made mountains of personal information—ranging from phone and email logs to
credit card and bank transactions—available to government officials at virtually the touch of
a button.”).
155 See Levinson, supra note 152, at 891. It is worth noting, though, that speakers may keep
secret their other efforts to fund the communication of ideas.
156 See Price, supra note 6, at 299 (“[I]f the Court continues to equate spending money with
speech, then the rationale in Miller loses much of its force.”).
157 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at std. 25-4.1(b) cmt; see also id. (“Financial transaction
records are quite personal. They do not alone indicate precisely what was purchased, but in
the aggregate they provide a virtual current biography of our lives. Every time a credit card
is swiped, the provider knows where the customer is located and quite a lot about what he or
she is doing. The provider will not know that the good purchased was Mein Kampf, but it will
know that at 10:42 a.m. this person purchased $13.49 of goods at the Borders book store in
Exton, PA, and that fifteen minutes earlier he spent $7.36 at Starbucks down the street.”).
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checks that captured a small snapshot of a customer’s financial
transactions not undertaken in cash. Today’s consumers use a wider
variety of non-cash payment options far more frequently,
generating more detailed third-party records of more financial
transactions.158 With each swipe of a credit or debit card, customers
provide third parties with detailed data about their actions,
locations, and preferences.159 The financial data third parties collect
today is far more sensitive than it was when Miller was decided,
justifying a re-evaluation of government efforts to obtain it without
a warrant.
Lastly, as several Justices noted in Miller itself, disclosure of
financial information to banking institutions is all but required to
exercise agency in modern society.160 The practically compulsory
nature of providing that information should also inform the Court’s
judgement as to financial data’s relative sensitivity for third-party
doctrine purposes.
Financial information of the sort at issue in Miller fits in the
middle of the sensitivity continuum, which should lead the Court to
advance to the second step of my proposed test: determining
whether the government collected enough sensitive information to
create an informational mosaic of the defendant citizen. The amount

158 See, e.g., U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 2016 at 2,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-study-20161222.pdf
(“U.S. noncash payments, including debit card, credit card, ACH, and check payments, are
estimated to have totaled over 144 billion with a value of almost $178 trillion in 2015, up
almost 21 billion payments or about $17 trillion since 2012 . . . . Total noncash payments
increased at an annual rate of 5.3 percent by number of 3.4 percent by value from 2012 to
2015.”); CASH PRODUCT OFFICE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE STATE OF CASH:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE 2015 DIARY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE, Nov. 2016,
https://www.frbsf.org/cash/publications/fed-notes/2016/november/state-of-cash-2015-diaryconsumer-payment-choice (“Cash is facing competition from other payment instruments. In
2015, 32 percent of consumer transactions were made with cash, compared with 40 percent
in 2012. Growing consumer comfort with payment cards and the growth of online commerce,
among other factors, contribute to this trend.”); TSYS, 2016 U.S. CONSUMER PAYMENT STUDY
6,
https://www.tsys.com/assets/TSYS/downloads/rs_2016-us-consumer-payment-study.pdf
(presenting findings from a study of 1,000 consumers and concluding that when consumers
were asked for their preferred method of payment, 40% responded credit, 35% responded
debit, and only 11% responded cash).
159 See supra note 157.
160 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“For all
practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to
a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.” (quotation omitted)).
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of sensitive financial information Miller addressed would paint just
such a mosaic. Several months of financial information portrays an
extremely clear picture of a citizen’s most private preferences,
opinions, locations, and habits. The government’s collection of four
months of the Miller defendant’s account information at two banks
provided detailed insights into his life. Even if the government
collected individual data points from those accounts without
running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the insights collected
would have been far more than any reasonable citizen should expect
the government to collect warrantlessly.161 Though Miller remains
an important milestone in the development of the third-party
doctrine, it’s time as the final word on bulk collection of financial
information should end.
2. Library E-Book Records
As an additional example of how the Court might implement the
sensitivity continuum in a third-party-doctrine case, consider a
detective’s effort to obtain records of a college senior’s e-book checkout history at the university library. Libraries often have detailed
privacy policies, and forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
maintain laws protecting library records from disclosure.162 But
third-party service providers like Amazon facilitate library
borrowing on their e-readers, allowing those third parties to collect
detailed reading records for later marketing use.163 Could a
detective working in a state with a restrictive library record statute

161 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at std. 25-4.1(a) cmt. (“[A]n individual bank
transaction may tell relatively little about a person, but records over a significant period may
form a ‘virtual current biography’ of an individual.” (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 529
P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974))).
162 BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader Privacy in
the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2013) (noting that the state statutes
vary, and some “allow disclosure of library records only subject to a warrant or similar
process”); see also Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA Patriot Act’s Application to Library Patron
Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283, 289 (2013) (collecting state statutes). Ard argues that while
“librarians have built an administrative and technical architecture that is highly protective
of patrons’ privacy” and has “proven capable of dealing with many threats to privacy in the
pre-networked world,” that regime is inadequate in the digital age. Ard, supra, at28.
163
See Ard, supra note 162, at 28–32 (describing a common e-book lending arrangement
between Amazon and public libraries); see also id. at 16 (“These third parties collect sensitive
user information even though they are neither integrated into our trusted institutions nor
bound by the same confidentiality obligations as the institutions themselves.”).
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rely upon the third-party doctrine to warrantlessly obtain troves of
Amazon’s records?164
Starting with the first step of my proposed test, such reading
records are moderately sensitive. As in the case of financial
information, Supreme Court jurisprudence in other constitutional
areas suggests that reading habits warrant constitutional
protection.165 In Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States,
the Court found unconstitutional a law requiring the Postmaster
General to detain mail the Secretary of the Treasury identified as
communist propaganda, then to maintain a list of those who
requested that such mail be delivered.166 Detaining mail would
almost certainly deter free speech, “especially as respects those who
have sensitive positions.”167 Citizens would feel inhibited to join a
list of those who have requested literature deemed “communist
political propaganda,” which would undermine robust First
Amendment debate.168
Similarly, in United States v. Rumely, the Court noted the
constitutional sensitivity of reading records.169 There, it considered
contempt charges against a publisher who refused to reveal a list of
the buyers of his “political[ly] tendentious” books.170 The Court
asserted that allowing Congress “to inquire into all efforts of private
individuals to influence public opinion through books and
periodicals . . . raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the
prohibition of the First Amendment.”171 Justice Douglas’s
concurring opinion likewise maintained that “[o]nce the government
164 Though some scholars have argued that the First Amendment should protect a reader’s
right to anonymity, “there has not yet been a case where a litigant has successfully made this
argument to protect digital reader records under the First Amendment.” Margot Kaminski,
Reading Over Your Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE
13, 26 (2012).
165 See Ard, supra note 162, at 8.
166 381 U.S. 301, 302–03 (1965).
167 Id. at 307.
168 Id. In a forceful concurring opinion, Justice Brennan maintained that “[t]he
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to
receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers
and no buyers.” Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
170 Id. at 42.
171 Id. at 46. Ultimately, the Court sidestepped this constitutional issue, however. See id.
at 46–47 (“[Prior law] strongly counsel[s] abstention from adjudication unless no choice is left.
Choice is left.”).
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can demand of a publisher the names of the purchasers of his
publications, the free press as we know it disappears.”172 These
cases illustrate the Court’s concern with the sensitivity of reading
histories like those third-party e-reader services maintain about
library patrons.
Library reading histories also convey significant substantive
meaning, making them more sensitive.173 The titles included in
those histories may suggest a citizens’ interest in iconoclastic
political movements, minority religious groups, rare medical
conditions, or even controversial theories of constitutional
interpretation.174 Where a citizen uses a library to conduct academic
research, the resulting library records “are quite sensitive because
they portray the user’s questions and interests in vivid detail.”175
The inherent meaning in library reading records suggests that they
be placed on the moderately sensitive side of the continuum I
propose.
Because the use of third-party services to obtain reading
materials remains somewhat voluntary, the relative sensitivity of
reading histories may be tempered. This activity is not so ubiquitous
as to become practically required to exercise agency in today’s
world. Though this fact does not wholly discount the sensitive
nature of such records, it should be reflected in its placement on the
sensitivity continuum. Additionally, the sensitivity of reading
records may be relatively lower than that of financial information
because the meaning reading records conveys is open to more varied
interpretations. McCarthy-era searches of library records “produced
little or no useful material, and government agents had an alarming
tendency to misuse the information.”176
172 Id. at 57 (Douglas, J., concurring). At that point, “the spectre of a government agent will
look over the shoulder of everyone who reads.” Id.
173 See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 436 (2008) (“Intellectual
records—such as lists of Web sites visited, books owned, or terms entered into a search
engine—are in a very real sense a partial transcript of a human mind.”).
174 Cf. id. at 389 (“The information created by [electronic technologies] includes not only
our preferences in toothpaste, but our taste in politics, literature, religion, and sex.”).
175 See Ard, supra note 162, at 13.
176 See Martin, supra note 162, at 288–89 (citations omitted); Ulrika Ekman Ault, Note,
The FBI’s Library Awareness Program: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1990) (stating that the FBI was never able to justify its Library
Awareness Program with any concrete evidence of its usefulness); see also RONALD KESSLER,
THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE F.B.I. 225 (2002) (“In the end, the program
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The above analysis suggests that reading records are moderately
sensitive. Thus, the judge in our hypothetical case should proceed
to the second step of my test and determine whether the government
collected enough of that data to create an informational mosaic of
the citizen, thereby conducting a search. The collection of relatively
low numbers of reading records—perhaps even as low as the fourmonth threshold at issue in Miller—might not trigger the warrant
requirement. But collection of four years of e-book reading records,
as in this example, certainly would. The government should be
required to obtain a warrant before obtaining such voluminous
records from a third party.
III. THE PROVISIONAL THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
In the prior Part, I recommended overturning Miller’s expansive
holding permitting unlimited warrantless collection of financial
information from third parties.177 Students of jurisprudence and
legal philosophy might object that overruling the holding in Miller
would work unacceptable violence upon well-established principles
of stare decisis.178 Such objections resonate strongly with wellmeaning law enforcement personnel who must employ Fourth
Amendment doctrine in their daily lives. Officers crave rulings like
Miller—stable, clear, bright lines that are easy to implement in the
field.179 Those desires are justified given the split-second decisions
that police work often encompasses. And stare decisis exists in part
to let interested parties like police officers rest assured that
constitutional jurisprudence will remain stable over time.180
produced very little useful information.”); FRANK J. DOWNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE:
THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA’S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 357 (1981).
177 See supra Part II.D.1.
178 I have made several arguments in favor of stare decisis on a variety of practical and
philosophical bases. See generally Michael Gentithes, In Defense of Stare Decisis, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799 (2009); Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 835 (2012) [hereinafter Gentithes, Precedent].
179 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–92 (2014) (“[I]f police are to have workable
rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . must in large part be done on a categorical
basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.”(quoting Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981))).
180 Citizens’ reliance interests and the practical workability of rules are primary
considerations in the Court’s discussion of the stare decisis principle. See Planned Parenthood
of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). Even critics of the
doctrine acknowledge the importance of such reliance interests. Antonin Scalia argued that
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But stare decisis should be less rigid when the Court considers
new applications of the third-party doctrine. Such cases determine
the constitutionality of new law enforcement techniques to gather
information about suspects over an extended timeline. These
techniques were often unimaginable just years earlier, let alone
across the four-decade history of the doctrine.181 Notions of privacy
are necessarily contingent upon the changing landscape of
technology and common practice in society. And broader society’s
interests are at stake when the Court determines whether the
government can warrantlessly collect data in the modern,
networked world. Faced with those challenges, the Court’s thirdparty doctrine decisions should be viewed as a series of provisional
prescriptions, temporarily determining whether to pause the
advance of government information-gathering capabilities. Those
rulings are inherently less permanent, and stare decisis should not
apply to them with full force.
I do not claim, as a descriptive matter, that the Court has treated
its rulings on new government information-gathering techniques as
provisional.182 Instead, the Court’s steadfast dedication to thirdparty precedents like Miller has, until recently, precluded necessary
adjustments to the doctrine. Decisions about new government
information-gathering techniques ought to be treated as provisional
to ensure that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect the
privacy and tranquility of American society.183
Stare decisis does not simply protect reliance for reliance’s sake.
In part, stare decisis is an acknowledgement that for some
questions, settlement is more important than accuracy.184 For
“[t]he whole function of the doctrine is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis
must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.” Antonin Scalia, Response,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40–41 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
181 The sheer scope of government data mining is one example. “Today the federal
government alone probably operates more than 200 data-mining programs, at least 120 of
which involve efforts to obtain personal information such as credit reports and credit card
transaction records.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 24, at 192.
182 If it did, the Justices who recently questioned the constitutionality of warrantless
collection of locational data could have easily coalesced around a reimagined third-party
doctrine. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–31 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
183 For a discussion of the unique public orientation of the Fourth Amendment, see supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
184 See David A. Stauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112
YALE L. J. 1717, 1725 (2003) ("A legal provision can settle things, and sometimes—when it is
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instance, while it is not inherently clear that driving on the right
side of the road is normatively superior to driving on the left, it is
clear that uniform settlement of the question is far superior to
ambiguity or inconsistency, which may cause more head-on
collisions on the nation’s highways. In other contexts within
constitutional criminal procedure, clear settlement of a
constitutional question is vital to ensure that officers can
operationalize the law in fleeting moments where lives hang in the
balance.185 But
difficult questions about the propriety of
government investigatory techniques may be less amenable to
settlement for settlement’s sake.
Society gains relatively little by deciding permanently, but
incorrectly, the limit of the government’s warrantless datacollection techniques. If citizens never change their practice of
driving on the right side of the road, they gain roadway safety at
little cost to their freedom of choice. But if government investigators
never change their practice of warrantlessly obtaining certain kinds
of information about citizens, they gain only marginal ease in their
investigations at huge costs to the privacy and tranquility of
millions of citizens. Third-party doctrine cases are not about splitsecond officer choices in the line of fire; rather, they concern
deliberative choices officers make when deciding to undertake longterm information gathering. That topic does not warrant the
promotion of stability for stability’s sake.
Stare decisis also acts as a ratcheting mechanism to protect hardfought societal gains. Where past generations struggled to establish
immutable principles of Justice, bulwarks against unwise
reconsideration are appropriate. Some commentators, such as the
late Antonin Scalia, have argued that preservation of ancient
societal gains is the whole purpose of constitutional law and that
constitutions exist “to prevent change—to embed certain rights in

in fact more important that things be settled than that they be settled right—the fact of
settlement alone is enough to make the provision binding.”).
185 For example, consider exceptions to the warrant requirement based upon exigent
circumstances or officer observation of criminal activity in public view, where there is a
heightened possibility that evidence will be destroyed rapidly or other members of the public
will be placed in harm’s way if officers fail to respond immediately.
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such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them
away.”186
But the Court does not protect hard-fought societal gains by
granting government investigators permanent permission to
warrantlessly access classes of information. Decisions on the reach
of the third-party doctrine, if imbued with the full force of stare
decisis, may do the opposite. How citizens and service providers use,
collect, and interpret information changes, often in dramatic ways,
over decades and centuries, making rulings in the area necessarily
contingent. Supreme Court Justices are as unlikely to predict
accurately how the government should access and collect
information in the future as they are to predict accurately how
tomorrow’s citizens and service providers may create new solutions
to emerging problems of daily life. No Justice should fancy herself a
prognosticator of the next great technological advance or consumer
need.187 Instead, the Justices ought to humbly acknowledge that
their rulings on the doctrine will almost certainly require
adjustment in the future and hence openly admit that the decisions
they make are provisional.188
When properly cast as provisional, rulings on the limits of new
government data-collection capacities would work much like
judicially enforced constitutional sunsets, a concept others and I
have argued for in the past. In those scenarios, the Court might
write an opinion expressly limiting that opinion’s stare decisis effect
to a set period or until a designated event, after which neither lower
courts nor the Supreme Court would be bound by it.189 “Sunsets
thereby invite relitigation” as the sunset approaches and the
186 Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Court in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 180, at 40.
187 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 258 (“Rapidly advancing technology has gotten us into
this pickle. Hard-to-change rules adopted by judges lacking in expertise is not the way to get
us out.”).
188 See id. at 232–33 (“In the face of rapidly changing technology, what is required of judges
is caution, some humility about their ability to understand what expectations of privacy
society deems reasonable, and deference to democratic processes.”); Gentithes, Precedent,
supra note 186, at 853 (discussing the importance of judicial humility).
189 Michael Gentithes, Sunsets on Constitutionality & Supreme Court Efficiency, 21 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 380–81 (2014) (quoting Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1244–45 (2004)) (“[T]he Court can hand down an opinion and
announce that its holding is entitled to the full effect of stare decisis for a set number of years.
. . or that it will be binding law until a designated event. . . .”).
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principles guiding the decision are re-opened for debate.190 The
same could be true of rulings on the limits of the third-party
doctrine. When the Court rules that some current privacy
protections are important enough to maintain for at least the
foreseeable future, it should leave open the possibility of revisiting
its holding as changes in social mores and society-wide behavior
dictate.
Though the Court has not consistently adopted this approach
when considering new extensions of the third-party doctrine, it
seemed to do so when it considered technological advances that
allow investigators to obtain new information directly, rather than
requesting it from a third party. For instance, the Court considered
“what limits there are upon the power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy” in Kyllo v. United States, where
investigators used heat sensors to detect an indoor marijuana
farm.191 There, the Court focused upon the likely advance of
surveillance technology: while the heat-sensors were “relatively
crude,” the Court noted that “the rule we adopt must take account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”192 If the government’s technological advance
190 Id. at 381. I have defended such judicially enforced constitutional sunsets on several
normative grounds, each of which broadly fall under the rubric of efficiency:

First, I argue that constitutional sunsets will allow the Court to more readily
reach constitutionally accurate decisions in close and controversial cases by
reducing the information deficit facing the Justices in those matters. Second,
I describe the externalities created by repetitive constitutional litigation that
fails to produce meaningfully new and useful constitutional rules and argue
that they can be reduced through the use of constitutional sunsets, which if
wielded properly, will reduce that type of low-value repetitive litigation in
the first place. The reduction in these external costs will benefit the Court
itself, the litigants before it, and the political branches. Third, constitutional
sunsets will allow the Court to more efficiently reach larger majorities and
thereby issue more stable and lasting opinions. Finally, constitutional
sunsets will allow the Court to reach decisions not just more acceptable to
those within the judiciary but to society in general because those decisions
will mark a significant advance in terms of the Rule of Law values of clarity,
publicity, and stability.
Id. at 394.
191 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
192 Id. at 36; see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or
its guarantees will wither and perish.”).
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intruded upon historical expectations of privacy in the home, the
Court needed to limit the government’s new capabilities to prevent
“police technology [from] erod[ing] the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.”193 The Court thus fashioned a rule prohibiting
warrantless collection of information about the interior of a home
obtained by sense-enhancing technology, “at least where . . . the
technology in question is not in general public use.”194
The Kyllo test is candidly provisional. A constitutional rule that
looks to broad public use of a technological advance is one that
everyone, including the Justices who formulated it, knows will
change over time. Kyllo is designed to respond to evolving social
realities in the same way the Court’s jurisprudence ought to respond
when confronting new government information-gathering
techniques.
Similarly, Miller should be viewed as a provisional ruling,
especially given the modern changes in how financial transactions
are conducted and recorded discussed above.195 Recognizing Miller
as a provisional decision would also render any new third-partydoctrine rulings under the two-step test I recommend subject to
change. But that is an acceptable, even desirable, outcome. Those
decisions determine whether information is sensitive enough to
deserve at least some protection, a necessarily provisional holding.
When the Court decides whether information is more like sensitive
medical data or unprotected phone numbers, it is not prescient
enough to know with certainty how collection of that information
will affect citizens’ daily affairs, especially as new technology
emerges. Citizens may adapt new practices that render that
information and its analogues more or less sensitive, requiring the
Court to revisit its provisional holdings.196

193 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also id. (“[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes . .
. there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of
privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this
minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis in original)).
194 Id.
195 See supra Part II.D; see also supra note 158 and accompanying text.
196 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 452 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[J]udicial interpretations of the reach of the constitutional protection of individual privacy
must keep pace with the perils created by these new devices.” (quotation omitted)).
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IV. RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY CONTROVERSIES WITHOUT MILLER
By excising Miller using my two-step sensitivity test, the Court
can generate the flexibility it needs to address government
acquisition of third-party records created by new technologies. It
will allow the Court to comfortably explain the result in Carpenter,
which addressed the collection of CSLI data generated by cell phone
companies that show roughly where the customer was based on
which cell tower a customer’s phone accessed at a particular time.197
The Carpenter majority excepted a week’s worth of CSLI from
warrantless collection under the third-party doctrine, opening the
door for varying applications of the doctrine to “distinct categor[ies]
of information.”198 However, the majority failed to clearly delineate
the difference “between cell-site records on the one hand and
financial and telephonic records on the other.”199
Miller hinders the Court’s resolution of Carpenter. Miller created
a false dichotomy that did not depend on the underlying data’s
sensitivity, classifying information as either wholly protected,
undisclosed data, or wholly unprotected data disclosed to a third
party.200 And Miller made clear that even moderately sensitive data,
like financial information or one’s locations in public, can be wholly
unprotected.201 Maintaining Miller’s holding on financial
information forces a choice between unattractive options: either
require a warrant each time the government collects any data about
a citizen’s locations from a third party or never require such a
warrant, no matter how much locational data the government
collects.202

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
Id. at 2219.
199 Id. at 2221 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200 See supra Part I.A and II.B.
201 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (discussing how there is no expectation of privacy in
contents of original checks and deposit slips based on the Fourth Amendment interest in bank
records).
202
See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44, at 570
[A]nyone who steps outside takes the risk that they may be seen, whether by
a police officer or civilian, whether to the grocery store, the abortion clinic,
or the NRA meeting. What they do not expect is that each of those moments
will be recorded and kept in perpetuity for later discovery and analysis by a
probing law enforcement officer, either wholesale or piecemeal.
197
198
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But the Court did not make a choice between those unattractive
options. Instead, it took a middle path, preserving the core of the
third-party doctrine, including Miller, but excepting at least one,
and potentially more, categories of information from
straightforward alignment with Miller’s dichotomy between
disclosed and undisclosed information.203 That decision is a vital
step towards a nuanced categorical approach, but is too tentative in
dealing with Miller’s holding itself.
Instead, the Court should overturn Miller’s holding that
sensitive information like financial data is not entitled to any
Fourth Amendment protection when collected by third parties. This
would leave in place the third-party doctrine that investigators have
relied upon for over forty years, but adjust it by accounting for the
sensitivity of some data types. The Court could hold that data like
financial transaction records, much like CSLI, is sensitive enough
to warrant some protection, placing each of those data categories
closer to the center of a continuum between wholly protected and
wholly unprotected information.
Excising Miller is necessary for the Court to adopt the
informational sensitivity rationale that would have justified the
Carpenter majority’s analysis. It would allow the Court to adopt a
clear framework to categorizing information for third-party doctrine
purposes, giving a workable model for future analyses in the area.
If the Court applied this two-step test , the outcome in Carpenter
would be the same, but the analysis would be far clearer. First, the
Court could determine the sensitivity of long-term location
information like CSLI by looking to its own jurisprudence as well as
the substantive meaning that the information conveys on its face.204
In the case of long-term location information, the Court’s
jurisprudence has suggested that it might be particularly sensitive.
In Jones, Justice Alito noted that “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy.”205 Two years later, Chief Justice Roberts

203 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these
novel circumstances. Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the
information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
204 For other illustrations of sensitivity determinations, see supra Part II.C and II.D.
205 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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similarly intimated the unique sensitivity of location information.
When discussing whether police officers could warrantlessly search
the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest in Riley,
Roberts noted that “[d]ata on a cell phone can also reveal where a
person has been. Historic location information is a standard feature
on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific
movements down to the minute, not only around town but also
within a particular building.”206 These nuggets of related
jurisprudence suggest the sensitivity of location information.
Likewise, long-term location information conveys significant
meaning on its face. Knowledge of a citizen’s locations reveals a
great deal about her life. It might show how she worships, whether
she suffers from physical or mental ailments, and which political
party she supports.207 It can reveal patterns inimical to sensitive
personal relationships she privately maintains with others—the
unique “intimate window into a person’s life” that the Carpenter
majority emphasized.208 Furthermore, a citizen’s mere knowledge
that she may be under constant surveillance necessarily curbs her
expressive behavior, even if the government has not actually been
watching.209 Long-term location information conveys significant,
sensitive information on its face. That inherent meaning, along with
the Court’s prior treatment of location information, suggests that
CSLI ought to be placed towards the more sensitive side of the
continuum I propose, and receive some Fourth Amendment
protection.210
CSLI is also sensitive because of the ubiquity of cell phones in
modern life. Though perhaps not required, devices that rely upon

134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citation omitted).
See supra note 202 and accompanying text. Though it may be unknowable to the
government investigator ex ante, some particular location data points are especially
sensitive, such as the trip to the abortion clinic or the by-the-hour motel. The mosaic theory’s
concern, in part, is the likelihood that long-term surveillance will inevitably capture a few of
those especially sensitive data points. See Smith, supra note 93, at 580–81.
208 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
209 Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 76–77 (arguing that individuals “internalize the notion
of being watched, even if it is not actually happening”).
210 Cf. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 141 (“The major aim of the Fourth Amendment—
unquestionably—is not to bolster majority rule but to afford shelter to political, religious, and
ideological minorities. It would surely astonish the Framers—not to mention those who feel
targeted for surveillance today (observant Muslims, for example)—to discover that the Fourth
Amendment affords no protection against spying tactics . . . .”).
206
207
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signals relayed through cell site towers are so commonplace that
their use is only marginally voluntary. Cell phone use is “such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that carrying one is
indispensable to participation in modern society.”211 Though this
does not defeat the application of the third-party doctrine to such
information, it does inform the sensitivity judgment that will help
define that doctrine’s limits regarding CSLI.
Second, the Court could consider the amount of CSLI data that
the police sought. Because CSLI is sensitive, government collection
of significant amounts paints an informational mosaic of the
defendant and constitutes a search. The CSLI in Carpenter gave the
government a crystallized image of the defendant’s daily life. And
given the high sensitivity of CSLI, that was plainly more invasive
to his privacy than the Fourth Amendment permits. As Justice Alito
noted in Jones, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could
not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period.”212 In Carpenter, the
government obtained just such a catalogue using signals emitted
from a device ubiquitous in most of our lives today. Such
warrantless activity violated the Fourth Amendment under my twostep test. While the collection of one or even several CSLI data
points may not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the
amalgamation of unlimited amounts of CSLI creates such a detailed
mosaic of a citizen’s life that it invades her reasonable expectations
of privacy and triggers the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.
By affording some protection to CSLI but retaining the thirdparty doctrine using the informational sensitivity rationale, the
Court can ensure that the Fourth Amendment serves not just law
enforcement interests, but also the privacy concerns of the common
man. This refocuses professor Orin Kerr’s influential view that the
Justices seek equilibrium between police officers and criminals in
the Fourth Amendment. As Kerr argues, the Court uses a
“correction mechanism” when either “changing technology or social
practice makes evidence substantially harder” or “substantially

211
212

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quotation omitted).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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easier for the government to obtain.”213 In the latter scenario, “the
Supreme Court often embraces higher protections to help restore
the prior level of privacy protection.”214
Kerr’s theory overemphasizes a game played only by the police
and criminals. According to Kerr, new technologies “threaten the
privacy/security balance because they enable both cops and robbers
to accomplish tasks they couldn’t before, or else to do old tasks more
easily or cheaply than before.”215 This view wrongly suggests that
investigators must face a particular degree of difficulty when
uncovering crime. The Fourth Amendment concerns more than just
the guilty and those who prosecute them. If a normatively desirable
“equilibrium” between those parties was the Amendment’s aim, it
would never limit the capabilities of investigators trying to catch
bad guys. Supreme Court cases “have historically recognized that
the warrant requirement is ‘an important working part of our
machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be
somehow “weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.’”216
The Fourth Amendment protects the broader public against
invasions upon their privacy and tranquility.217 The Court’s rulings
protect hundreds of millions of innocent people in society, not just
criminals. That society-wide concern should lead the Court to adjust
the third-party doctrine for the rest of us. It should classify some
information, such as the CSLI data in Carpenter or the financial
data in Miller, as neither wholly protected nor wholly unprotected
when collected by third parties. All citizens—not just criminals—
use third party services that generate sensitive data every day,
never imagining that the government might collect all that
information on a whim.218 In some amounts, the government may
Kerr, supra note 11, at 480.
Id.
215 Id. at 486. “The police continuously devise new ways to catch criminals. Criminals
continuously devise new ways to avoid being caught. This state of flux poses an
underappreciated difficulty for judges interpreting the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 481.
216 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
217 See Gentithes, supra note 11, at 939.
218 It is worth noting that the majority of citizens may not understand how CSLI is
generated. Recent surveys indicate
213
214

that the majority of cell phone users do not know that their cell phone
provider collects their location data, and roughly 15% of users affirmatively
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collect that data warrantlessly; in others, such as where the
government amalgamates troves of highly sensitive data, it should
first obtain a warrant based upon probable cause.
CONCLUSION
Though the third-party doctrine may not be doomed, it
desperately needs adjustment in a modern, networked world.
Neither instinctively touting it as an absolute rule nor bashing it as
a misunderstanding of the way modern citizens disclose information
to service providers will provide the needed adjustment. Instead,
the Supreme Court should end Miller’s time at the forefront of the
doctrine, allowing the doctrine to account for the sensitivity of
disclosed information. Sensitive information, like financial data or
CSLI, should receive some protection even after it is conveyed to
third parties. Warrantless collection of individual points of such
sensitive information may be permissible, but the Court should
require a warrant before government investigators can amalgamate
enough such data to paint a detailed mosaic of a citizen’s life.

believe that their data is not collected. Participants were asked whether their
cell phone service provider regularly collects information on their physical
location using their cell phone. Nearly three-quarters of participants (73.5%)
answered either “No” (15.0%) or “I Don’t Know” (58.5%) to this question,
compared to 26.5% who answered “Yes.” Moreover, most of the 213
respondents who answered “Yes” referred to GPS or Google Maps in a followup explanation, while only 27 respondents referenced anything that could be
construed as involving cell site location tracking. This suggests that very few
users (only 3.3% of all respondents) are aware of the cell site location
information at issue in most cell phone surveillance cases.
Tokson, supra note 47, at 177. However, what citizens actually know about how data is
gathered by third parties might not actually drive the Court’s reasoning in these cases. “The
rhetoric of knowledge may . . . mask the normative judgment that actually drives the
decision.” Id. at 151.
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